Key Agricultural Sector Trends in Response to the Top 5 Challenges of 2026

Exports and Logistics

The lack of a full-fledged alternative to Odesa’s deep-water ports has become the main bottleneck in Ukrainian agricultural logistics, threatening the country’s macrofinancial stability and the survival of the sector itself. Instead of the traditional 5.5–6 million tonnes, Ukraine exports only 2.4–2.5 million tonnes per month, as alternative routes are operating at their limits, with a reserve capacity for increasing throughput by an additional 10–15%.

Under these conditions, Ukraine risks being unable to export 35 million tonnes of grain by the end of the marketing year, potentially losing up to $7 billion in foreign exchange earnings. For farmers, this means a loss of liquidity ahead of the spring sowing campaign: global prices currently do not cover the additional costs of European logistics, which reach €70–90 per tonne for deliveries to Constanța or Gdańsk.

This crisis is being artificially exacerbated by domestic infrastructure problems and inefficient railway processes, which are creating a significant shortage of locomotive traction capacity. Around 20,000 loaded railway wagons have accumulated on the network, forcing locomotives to perform enormous amounts of unnecessary shunting work instead of mainline transportation — constantly pulling the required wagons out of queues numbering in the thousands.

The main reason for this collapse is the lack of end-to-end planning. Ukrzaliznytsia often sends cargo to the border that is not currently expected there (for example, ore or corn), while foreign carriers with reserved train paths are waiting for wagons carrying a different crop. Additional locomotives alone will not be enough to solve this problem: full synchronization of schedules between the Ukrainian shipper, the foreign carrier and the recipient of the goods is necessary. Establishing a proper end-to-end planning system will allow Ukrzaliznytsia to use its existing infrastructure and locomotives as efficiently as possible without the need for external resources.

Against the backdrop of transport barriers, the sector is facing a large-scale shortage of crop storage capacity, and some corn will have to remain in the fields over winter. The situation with sunflower seeds is particularly critical: the harvested 10.5 million tonnes require twice as much storage space as grain crops and deteriorate quickly due to an increase in the acid value. Therefore, the government’s decision to prioritize vegetable oil exports is logical and economically justified. To put this into perspective, while exporting one tonne of grain brings approximately $220 to the economy, one tonne of oil generates $1,300. Prioritizing exports will allow oil extraction plants to free up storage tanks, continue processing and, most importantly, keep purchasing raw materials from farmers.

Sowing Under Cost-Saving Conditions

Ukrainian farmers are reducing winter crop plantings amid difficulties in selling their harvests. A total of 6.32 million hectares of winter crops are expected to be sown for the 2027 harvest, which is 399,000 hectares, or 5.9%, less than last year. In particular, the area planted with winter barley may decrease by 16.1% to 594,000 hectares, while the area under wheat and triticale may decline to 4.54 million hectares.

At the same time, actual sowing figures are currently lagging even behind the reduced forecasts. As of November 3, when the campaign was already nearing completion, 5.60 million hectares had been sown, representing 88.6% of the planned area. The greatest shortfall is observed in winter barley, with only 70.8% of the forecast area sown.

The reasons for this situation include the accumulation of unsold grain, limited export opportunities, high logistics costs and a shortage of working capital. As a result, farmers are being forced to reconsider their crop structure in favor of crops with better sales prospects and profitability. This could lead to a further reduction in grain crop areas and an expansion of sunflower and soybean plantings.

Rising Fuel Prices and Destruction of Storage Facilities

Rising fuel prices and systematic Russian attacks on storage and port infrastructure are increasing pressure on Ukraine’s agricultural sector. Since the beginning of 2026, the average price of diesel fuel has risen by almost 80%, from UAH 58.3 to UAH 104.5 per liter in early November. This significantly increases farmers’ costs for field operations, transportation and product exports.

At the same time, Russia continues to attack grain elevators, grain storage facilities and ports in Greater Odesa. According to the Ministry of Economy, the region’s ports suffered more than 180 strikes during the first months of 2026, which in certain periods led to a 20–30% reduction in export capacity.

In particular, the July attacks halted operations at the export terminal of a Ukrainian producer in Chornomorsk, damaged storage facilities and resulted in some products being blocked or lost. The combination of higher fuel prices, infrastructure destruction and disruptions to maritime exports increases logistics costs, delays crop sales and worsens producers’ financial conditions. As a result, farmers are forced to accumulate products and limit investment in the next production season.

Employee Reservation from Mobilization

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the agricultural sector has been affected by a significant shortage of personnel. Finding a qualified employee in rural areas has never been easy, but mobilization has added further challenges. Do mobilization processes and employee reservation from military service affect staffing levels? Of course they do. But let’s look at the numbers!

According to 77.8% of UCAB member companies, employee reservation has a significant and, in some cases, critical impact on recruitment. Some 69.4% have vacancies they have been unable to fill for more than three months, 68% are experiencing a shortage of technical specialists, and 61% lack sales managers. Employee reservation plays a critical role in recruiting these specialists.

However, this situation is the result of several factors. First, to obtain the status of a critically important enterprise, a company must emerge from the shadow economy and maintain completely transparent relations with the state. Second, obtaining critically important enterprise status does not guarantee that it will be retained. The agro-industrial complex went through a government restructuring during which, for six months, we lost the ministry responsible for a fundamental sector of Ukraine’s economy. As a result, agricultural businesses had to transfer all their stacks of documents to the Ministry of Economy, involving more than 6,000 critically important enterprises in the sector. The Ministry of Agrarian Policy was restored, with the appointment of a minister that allowed many to breathe a sigh of relief. However, this once again brought changes.

Over the past six months, the government has changed the rules for employee reservation and the designation of critically important enterprises three times and is preparing a fourth round of changes by the end of the year. Today, a producer does not know whether they will be able to retain their workforce tomorrow. Therefore, the lack of predictability and clear rules of the game is felt by everyone — businesses, which have to interrupt operational processes to deal with the regulations, and employees, who prefer not to take risks under conditions of complete uncertainty.

European Integration

Ukraine’s agricultural sector is continuously working to introduce European standards, as European integration is a long-term process that began long before Ukraine received EU candidate status and will continue even after our official accession to the EU. We are currently awaiting the opening of the fifth (agricultural) negotiating cluster, which is expected to take place by the end of this year or as early as next spring. Its opening will mark a transition to substantive dialogue: both sides must sit down at the negotiating table to determine the exact conditions under which Ukraine will implement European legislation. The question lies in the state’s internal capacity to implement EU regulations and the readiness of agribusiness itself to adopt the new rules of the game.

At the same time, the European side, while expecting us to produce agricultural products according to EU standards, is apparently not yet ready to immediately and fully open its single market to us. This is confirmed by the European Commission’s EU enlargement strategy presented on October 6, which envisages that access to the European market for Ukrainian agricultural products considered sensitive by the EU may remain restricted even after our accession.

Brussels clearly remembers the experience of introducing autonomous trade measures in June 2022, when a sharp increase in Ukrainian exports prompted serious complaints from European farmers, particularly in neighboring EU member states. Given these sentiments, our integration must be carefully considered. We need to calculate precisely how many years and what kind of financial and technical support the sector will require for the transition.

That is why agricultural associations emphasize the need for a 10-year transition period from the moment of EU accession. This will allow businesses to properly structure their technological processes in line with their investment capabilities. The sooner we begin preparations and search for financing, the more time we will have to adapt.

An additional challenge is that European legislation is always a «moving target,» as the European Union itself is undergoing constant changes.

Our country has to operate in a constant catch-up mode: EU regulations are updated, and it is necessary to keep track of these changes. Next year, the current seven-year budget cycle will come to an end, and negotiations are already underway on the future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for 2028–2035, in which Ukraine may also become a full participant. In addition to the CAP, it is also important to monitor the EUDR (the deforestation directive, which will directly affect the access of soybeans and soybean processing products to the EU), the CBAM mechanism, updates to renewable energy directives (the transition to RED III), as well as food safety regulations and animal welfare standards. Although statements are currently being made in the EU about intentions to simplify certain requirements, it is important to understand that these are long-term trends — one regulation will inevitably be replaced by another. Against the backdrop of these developments, the issue of current trade remains particularly pressing.

Given the limitations of port logistics, there were hopes that the European Commission would make concessions regarding partial trade liberalization or an increase in our export volumes to the European market. However, due to the political sensitivity of this issue among member states, these expectations unfortunately have not been met. Nevertheless, it is important for Ukrainian businesses to understand that our export opportunities are not limited exclusively to the quotas established under the trade provisions of the Association Agreement. There are also global WTO quotas that the European Union allocates to third countries and under which Ukraine currently qualifies.

Unfortunately, not all exporters take advantage of this instrument. Therefore, farmers should not neglect this opportunity — they need to contact government institutions and relevant industry associations to make the most effective use of WTO quotas to support their export positions.

Exactly one week from now, Ukraine will celebrate Agricultural Workers’ Day. AgroPortal.ua, together with its partners, has prepared a series of articles titled «Effective Tools for Farmers» #EffectiveAgro, aimed at helping farmers adapt to changing weather and financial conditions while maintaining high yields.